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Abstract
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is attracting a great deal of attention and it is important to
investigate the public perceptions of AI and their impact on the perceived credibility of
research evidence. In the literature, there is evidence that people overweight research
evidence when framed in neuroscience findings. In this paper, we present the findings
of the first investigation of the impact of an AI frame on the perceived credibility of
educational research evidence. In an experimental study, we allocated 605 participants
including educators to one of three conditions in which the same educational research
evidence was framed within one of: AI, neuroscience, or educational psychology. The
results demonstrate that when educational research evidence is framed within AI
research, it is considered as less credible in comparison to when it is framed instead
within neuroscience or educational psychology. The effect is still evident when the
subjects’ familiarity with the framing discipline is controlled for. Furthermore, our
results indicate that the general public perceives AI to be: less helpful in assisting us to
understand how children learn, lacking in adherence to scientific methods, and to be
less prestigious compared to neuroscience and educational psychology. Considering the
increased use of AI technologies in Educational settings, we argue that there should be
significant attempts to recover the public image of AI being less scientifically robust
and less prestigious than educational psychology and neuroscience. We conclude the
article suggesting that AI in Education community should attempt to be more actively
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Introduction
Within the last decade, the private sector has invested heavily in large scale projects to
develop AI that can interact with humans (Hall and Pesenti 2017). This has resulted inmany
of these technologies becoming part of our everyday practice in work, home, leisure,
healthcare, social care, and education. There is a great benefit to be gained from some
applications of AI, as they have the potential to save time, reduce the human effort to
perform tasks and reduce costs (Yang et al. 2017). Through the automation of repetitive and
monotonous tasks, AI systems can relieve humans from both dangerous and menial tasks,
improve well-being through the provision of reliable care assistance for the ageing popula-
tion, improve service encounters through standardisation, and provide companionship and
affective aids for different user groups (Winfield and Jirotka 2018). As argued by Malone
(2018) AI systems also have the potential to augment human intelligence inmachine-human
collaborations as ‘superminds’. In healthcare for example, where deep learning algorithms
have been trained to identify pathology automatically from optical coherence tomography
(OCT) scans to enable early detection and triage of sight-threatening diabetic retinopathy
and age-relatedmacular degeneration, to advise doctors, and interpret fMRI scans (De Fauw
et al. 2018). These technologies are developing at a rapid pace and they are increasingly
entering our everyday lives. The speed of AI invention and application as well as the
excitement associated with it has lead researchers to question whether AI explanations exert
a “seductive allure” on individuals, leading them to judge bad explanations or arguments
framed inAImore favourably (Giattino et al. 2019). A similar phenomenonwas noted in the
early 2000s and 2010swhen the term ‘neuroscience’was similarly popular and its ‘seductive
allure’ was noted by some researchers (McCabe and Castel 2008; Im et al. 2017).
On the other hand, not all mentions of AI are associated with positive public
attitudes (European commission 2015, BSA 2015), and concerns regarding the poten-
tially harmful impact of AI technologies are also often raised in the media and public
rhetoric. Moreover, highly respected academics and public figures have exacerbated the
construction of dystopian scenarios of AI machines causing existential consequences to
humankind. For instance, Steven Hawking warns that AI could end mankind1 and Elon
Musk has argued that AI is highly likely to destroy humans.2 Besides, there are other
arguments on the observed and expected impact of AI on the future of the workforce,
and related fears around mass unemployment (Frey and Osborne 2013; Brynjolfsson
and Mcafee 2014). These negative annotations have the potential to skew public
perceptions and avoid or ignore AI systems. For instance, although evidence-based
algorithms more accurately predict the future than do human forecasters, when fore-
casters are deciding whether to use a human forecaster or an algorithm, they often
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These recent concerns lend considerable weight to the need to explore the public’s
perceptions of AI and its potential impact on the credibility judgements of research
evidence when in comparison to other areas of science. Investigating the public
perceptions of AI is important as it can lead to regulatory activity with potentially
serious repercussions in society (Stone et al. 2016) as well as for helping us define
social policy (Manikonda and Kambhampati 2018). More specifically for AI in
Education, potential aversion of the public to AI is costly for society at large. For
instance, AI in Education systems can be comparable to human tutors in terms of their
effectiveness (i.e, VanLehn 2011; du Boulay 2016), however many people remain
resistant to using them, and actively demonstrate against their use in schools.3 For
effective adoption of AI, it is important to create a shared understanding between the
key stakeholders of AI Technologies including public, educators, and academia
(Cukurova et al. 2019)
In this article, we explored the public perceptions of AI and their perceived credibility
of research evidence about education framed to different areas of scientific research,
specifically: educational psychology, neuroscience, and AI.While in the past, there have
been some attempts at investigating the public perceptions of AI through opinion polls
(Gaines-Ross 2016); with a longitudinal study of articles (Fast and Horvitz 2016), and
through social media analysis (Manikonda and Kambhampati 2018); to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first investigation of whether our attitudes towards AI blur our
perceptions of the credibility of educational research evidence.
Public Perceptions of AI and the Credibility of Educational Research
Evidence
Studying public perceptions of AI is quite challenging, not the least due to the lack of a
clear definition of the term AI. As argued by Stone et al. (2016), laypeople and experts
alike have varied understandings of what AI means. Even in the narrowest,
engineering-centric definitions, AI refers to a broad constellation of computing tech-
nologies including a broad range of machine learning approaches (Fast and Horvitz
2017). There are a few previous studies looked at the impact of AI on public
perceptions as well as the range of future outcomes (Dietterich and Horvitz 2015).
For instance, Fast and Horvitz (2016) conducted a longitudinal study of articles
published on AI in the New York Times between January 1986 and May 2016. This
study revealed that from 2009 the discussion on AI has sharply increased and is more
optimistic than pessimistic. Gaines-Ross (2016) investigated the lay people’s percep-
tion of AI and found out that those individuals who do not have a professional
background in technology generally have positive perceptions of AI. More recently,
Manikonda and Kambhampati (2018) collected and analysed over two million AI-
related tweets posted by over 40,000 people and showed that 1) the sentiments
expressed in the AI discourse are more positive than an average twitter discourse 2)
lay public tend to be more positive about AI than expert tweeters and 3) women tend to
be more positive about AI impacts than men. In general, existing research on the public
3 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/21/technology/silicon-valley-kansas-schools.html
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perceptions of AI shows greater levels of optimism than pessimism about AI (60 Mi-
nutes, 2016), but they also show increasing existential fear and worry about jobs (BSA
2015). None of the existing studies compares AI with other subject areas of Educational
Psychology and Neuroscience, our study presented here is the first to compare these
three subject areas related to educational contexts and show the impact of public
perceptions of AI on their judgment of the educational research credibility.
Credibility is described as the believability of a source or a message (Metzger and
Flanagin 2015). Here, it is important to clarify the difference between veracity and
credibility. Veracity is a concept that refers to the true or false nature of a piece of
evidence (Derczynski et al. 2017). On the other hand, credibility is a perceptual variable
which is subjectively perceived by recipients and is not an objective attribute (Shariff
et al. 2017). Wassmer and Eastman (2005) differentiate between actual and perceived
credibility, whereby actual credibility can be equalled with veracity. Here, we are
investigating the perceived credibility of research evidence presented in different
subject frames. It is important to note that in this study, the evidence presented in all
subject frames is the same, and therefore the veracity of the evidence is also the same
(please see the first two columns of appendix C). However, we investigate the extent to
which the perceived credibility of the evidence differs.
The presentation of unfamiliar information has been demonstrated to impact upon
peoples’ judgment of the credibility of the evidence presented in detail (Appelman and
Sundar 2016). Perceived credibility, which is a subjective measure shaped by the
impressions of the observer, can be formed through two distinct forms of information
processing. It can either be shaped through a central route or a peripheral route (the
Heuristic Systematic Model, Chaiken 1987). In the central route, receivers have higher
cognitive processing ability and/or are highly motivated, which increases the possibility
of them to be more engaged with and to scrutinise a message. On the other hand, the
peripheral route is taken when people are neither motivated nor able to cognitively
process the information provided. In this route, therefore, the perceived credibility is
shaped by peripheral cues or heuristic rules, the subject frame in which the evidence is
presented, for example. Similar ideas are echoed in other models (the elaboration
likelihood model of persuasion, Petty and Cacioppo 1986). It can be argued that
unfamiliar research evidence is often processed in a more peripheral way rather than
a central way.
Heuristic judgements are found to be triggered by specific aspects of the
information, source, or interaction situation (Kruglanski and Gigerenzer 2011).
Here, we compare three subject discipline framings for the same research
evidence: Educational Psychology, Neuroscience, and AI. In the case of neuro-
science, suggestions to improve educational practice with neuroscience findings
have been explained as an appeal to neuroscience findings rather than the
actual contribution of those findings (Hardiman et al. 2012). This, in turn,
affects the perceived credibility of educational neuroscience as a scientific
discipline (Schwartz et al. 2012). In the case of AI, to the best of our
knowledge, such an exploration of the potential framing impact of AI on
research findings in Education has not been investigated previously.
The fact that perceived credibility is often processed by readers with peripheral cues
and heuristic rules and in recognition of the negative images and science fiction
associations of AI in the media we hypothesise that:
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i) AI in Education is perceived as less relevant to learning, adheres less to the
scientific methods, and less prestigious than Educational Psychology and
Neuroscience;
ii) research evidence framed in AI in Education is considered as less credible than the
same research evidence framed in Educational Psychology which, in turn, is
considered as less credible than Neuroscience frame due to ‘the seductive allure
of neuroscience’ (Im et al. 2017).
In this paper, we test these hypotheses and present our results about whether the AI
framing of research evidence impacts on the perceived credibility of research evidence
in Education.
Literature Review
The perceived credibility of AI framing has not yet been studied. However, the relevant
phenomenon of ‘the seductive allure of neuroscience’ is widely studied and reported in
the literature (McCabe and Castel 2008; Weisberg et al. 2008; Im et al. 2017) which
will be reviewed in this section.
The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience
People have been shown to give more weight to evidence framed within neuroscience.
Weisberg et al. (2008) asked participants to judge the quality of arguments in articles on
psychological phenomena, and their results show that the inclusion of a neuroscience
finding reduces the ability of novice participants to distinguish the good explanations
from the bad ones. Similarly, McCabe and Castel (2008) gave their participants a one-
page summary of a cognitive neuroscience finding written for the popular press in the
control condition. In the experimental condition, participants were provided with the
same information accompanied by a bar chart or a brain image from an fMRI scan.
Participants rated the scientific reasoning most highly when the information was
accompanied by an fMRI image, so the authors concluded that neuroscience explana-
tions are more credible when they are accompanied by brain images. Nevertheless,
more recent studies, failed to replicate these findings. Farah and Hook (2013) used a
similar strategy to present neuroscience explanations with a brain image, with a bar
chart, or on its own. They found that the addition of a brain image did little to change
the perceived quality of scientific explanations. Similarly, Michael et al. (2013) under-
took a comprehensive study on the topic with almost two thousand participants and
reached similar conclusions to Farah and Hook (2013). More recently, to investigate the
impact of superfluous neuroscience explanations, Fernandez-Duque et al. (2015) un-
dertook four experiments with 385 college students. Students were asked to read brief
descriptions of psychological phenomena, each one accompanied by an explanation of
varying quality and followed by superfluous information of various types. The authors
concluded that superfluous neuroscience information increased the judged quality of
the argument for both good and bad explanations, whereas accompanying fMRI
pictures had no impact above and beyond the neuroscience text. Although, recent
evidence shows that the addition of a brain picture does little to increase the perceived
International Journal of Artificial Intelligence in Education (2020) 30:205–235 209
quality of a neuroscientific explanation (Hook and Farah 2013; Michael et al. 2013;
Schweitzer et al. 2013; Gruber and Dickerson 2012); these studies do not investigate
whether extraneous neuroscience information (either pictorial or textual) has an influ-
ence on the interpretations of research evidence that is non-neuroscientific in all other
aspects. This is an important distinction. It leads to the suggestion that, rather than
perceptual issues of brain images, the seductive allure of neuroscience might be driven
by the conceptual properties of brain-related subjects. In order to investigate whether
the presence of neuroscience information exerts an undue influence on judgments of
research quality, Fernandez-Duque et al. (2015) undertook a series of experiments and
concluded that superfluous neuroscience information was more alluring than social
science information and more alluring than information from prestigious hard sciences
such as chemistry, biology, and genetics.
This finding illustrates that neuroscience bias might be conceptual rather than
pictorial. Such bias may exert undue influence on judgments of evidence credibility,
as has been supported more recently by evidence generated from various disciplines.
More specifically, within the context of Education, Im et al. (2017), recruited 320
participants from the general public and asked them to judge the credibility of research
articles that are framed with neuroscientific verbal, graphical, and brain images input.
Their results showed that members of the public judge the credibility of educational
articles that have extraneous verbal neuroscience findings and brain images higher than
those articles with no extraneous neuroscience information. Moreover, the effect
persists even after controlling for individual differences in familiarity with education,
attitudes towards psychology and knowledge of neuroscience. Similarly, the seductive
allure of neuroscience has been observed to different extents in different fields includ-
ing law (Schweitzer and Saks 2011), and marketing (Ariely and Berns 2010).
Possible Explanations of the Seductive Allure of Neuroscience and Their Relevance
to the Incredible AI Effect
There are various hypotheses generated to explain the potential effect of the seductive
allure of neuroscience. The most common one is the perceptual processing hypothesis
(Keehner et al. 2011; Reber & Schwarz, 1999) which argues that perceptual features of
brain pictures, such as their three-dimensionality, biases people’s judgement of the
accompanying text. These arguments can be likened to some of the examples of AI in
education. These examples include AI texts accompanied by pictorial information
ranging from accurately represented algorithms to completely irrelevant representations
of futuristic robots. Another hypothesis is that the prestige of neuroscience as a hard
science is higher than some other sciences and that this prestige biases people’s
judgment of the research evidence (Keil et al. 2010). Although Fernandez-Duque
et al. (2015) show that the prestige of “hard” sciences does not extend to natural
sciences such as biology, chemistry, and genetics, it might well extend to brain-related
subjects, such as neuroscience and AI. Explanations that invoke neuroscience may be
viewed as reflecting greater expertise, and similarly, explanations that invoke AI may
also be considered to reflect greater expertise. Similarly, it might also be the case that
the jargon of certain disciplines might create an impression that the information
presented is more or less credible. For instance, just as adding random nonsensical
mathematical equations to abstracts increases their perceived credibility (Eriksson
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2012), using the jargon of AI and algorithms might, therefore, affect the perceived
credibility of the presented information. It was also argued that neuroscience’s role as
the “engine of the mind”, in the sense that brain models presented in neuroscience are
the best explanations of how the mind works, might convince people that the informa-
tion framed in neuroscience is more credible (Fernandez-Duque et al. 2015). This
explanation also aligns with the findings that the allure of neuroscience does not extend
to the prestige of the “hard sciences”, but the information should be somehow framed in
neuroscientific explanation. On the other hand, the authors’ brain-as-engine-of-mind
hypothesis, could equally relate to AI, because most of the models and explanations in
AI are intertwined and influenced by each other and a better understanding of neuro-
science plays a vital role in building AI (Hassabis et al. 2017).
Limitations of Previous Studies and Confounding Factors in Credibility of Research
Evidence Evaluations
Most aforementioned existing studies are criticised for various limitations. For instance,
earlier studies by Weisberg et al. (2008) and McCabe and Castel (2008) were criticised
for the amount of information presented in control and experiment conditions, because
these were not equal. It is, therefore, possible that the addition of the neuroscience
information simply acted to conceal the circularity of the explanations. Surprisingly, the
same limitation concerning the article length confounding with the results was also
present in more recent studies (Im et al. 2017). However, some other studies showed
that even when article length is equated, the seductive allure of neuroscience effect
remains (Weisberg et al. 2015).
The earlier neuroscience studies also failed to investigate whether the results were
associated with other individual differences among the participants, such as familiarity
with the subject, attitudes towards the subjects, particular demographic features of the
participants, their prior knowledge of the topic, or their reasoning ability. These are
important confounding factors in the investigation of the AI context. For instance,
Fernandez-Duque et al. 2015 found that the ability to reason with analytical thinking,
and, a belief in dualism or free will do not protect a participant from the neuroscience
bias in judging the credibility of research evidence. However, people do rate the
credibility of research higher when the findings are consistent with their prior belief
(Scurich and Shniderman 2014). Additionally, when the participants have limited
knowledge of the scientific method being reported in what they read, the neuroscience
bias of the credibility they award to the research is bigger (Rhodes et al. 2014).
Therefore, the familiarity of the participants with the topic is a significant confounding
factor that should be taken into account (Im et al. 2017).
Methodology
In this study, we have two hypotheses as presented earlier and we investigate them with
three research questions. The first research question is whether the framing discipline of
the same educational research evidence has an impact on the public’s perceived
credibility of it. We investigate three disciplinary frames: neuroscience, educational
psychology and AI. Due to divergence between the realities of AI and the ways that it is
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portrayed in various forms of media, we hypothesise that people’s credibility value will
be skewed compared to other articles that present the same evidence in educational
psychology and neuroscience frames. This is the first investigation of the concept, we
have therefore not brought in any experimental levelling to change the amount or type
of framing presented to the participants.
Our second research question is to investigate how a potentially skewed public perception
of evidence framed throughAIwould compare to the seductive allure of neuroscience effect.
To investigate these two research questions, we use similar articles to those used in a
recent study investigating the seductive allure of neuroscience effect in education (Im
et al. 2017). Then, we compare the credibility values of neuroscience and AI frames with
the credibility values of an Educational Psychology frame for the same research evidence.
Our last research question is about the attitudes of the public towards Educational
Psychology, Neuroscience, and AI and how some of the individual differences impact on
the credibility judgments of the public. Based on the literature reviewed above, we are
particularly interested in two potential confounding variables: whether participants’ famil-
iarity with, and their attitudes towards the fields of Educational Psychology, Neuroscience,
and AI account for any particular bias in their judgments of research evidence credibility.
Participants, Design, and Study materials
We target general public participants, and we, therefore, recruited participants via an
online survey development cloud-based software company. This is a platform where
adult ‘workers’ from across the world sign up to perform online ‘jobs’ for compensa-
tion (Follmer et al. 2017). The online survey was made available to members of the
public who live in the United Kingdom and the United States, who are over =18-year-
old, and whose primary language is English. The survey was introduced within the
context of asking participants for their opinion on a variety of short educational articles
and their evaluation of the amount of credibility they assign to each article. The
participants were informed that the survey would take around 15–25 min of their time.
The survey was anonymous and no personal details were required, and participants had
the right to withdraw from the survey at any point. Each participant was compensated
with £2.25 upon completion of the survey. We used the automated block randomiser
functionality of the online survey platform to randomly assign participants in to one of
the disciplinary frames of AI, Educational Psychology, or Neuroscience. We also used
item randomisation for credibility and attitude surveys to avoid item order bias. Each
participant gave informed consent through an online confirmation.
605 respondents filled in our questionnaire, out of which only 502 provided
a full response. After cleaning responses indicative of random clicking, 345
respondents remained. 157 participants (31%) were excluded because they
failed the attention check items designed to catch participants who do not
engage with the survey but instead respond randomly (Oppenheimer et al.
2009). This exclusion rate is comparable to those other studies which recruited
online participants (i.e. Chandler et al. 2014; Im et al. 2017). Each of the
participants was randomly assigned to a different version of the questionnaire,
containing article excerpts presenting the same evidence in the three different
subject frames (see Table 1 below). For details on the data collection tools used
please see the appendix provided.
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A set of four background questions and nine attitude questions was shared with all
the participants, while the rest of the questionnaire contained three discipline-specific
articles assigned differently to each group. For each of the three articles, the participants
were asked to rate five different credibility scores and one score assessing their
familiarity with the topic. The frequency charts of the four background questions,
regarding gender, education level, their major, and age, are shown in the Fig. 1.
These demographics indicate that the majority of the sample was aged between 25
and 34, had studied to tertiary level, approximately two-thirds were female, and most of
them were non-specialists in the fields of AI, Educational Psychology, and Neurosci-
ence. More specifically, the participants involved 66 educators, 43 computer scientists,
40 psychologists, 6 neuroscientists, and 190 participants from other professional areas.
130 participants had a high school degree, 112 had an undergraduate, 66 had a Masters’
degree and 32 had a PhD. The nine attitude items contained three questions examining
the attitudes of the participant to each of the three disciplines. Specifically, all partic-
ipants were asked about (1) whether the discipline can help understand how children
learn; (2) whether researchers practising in the discipline adhere to scientific methods;
and (3) whether society views the discipline as prestigious - for each of the three
disciplines.
Table 1 The three experiment groups
Group Number of subjects Percentage
1: Neuroscience 106 30.7
2: Educational psychology 121 35.1
3: Artificial intelligence 118 34.2
Fig. 1 Frequency of the participants’ demographic feautures
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The dependant construct of credibilitywas operationalized by five different variables (all
measured using 7 points Likert scale, 7 = “Strongly agree” to 1 = “Strongly disagree”). The
five Likert items each participant scored for each of the three articles they were exposed to
are summarized in Table 2 along with the variable name we will use in this paper.
We considered perceived credibility as a multidimensional construct, which mainly
relies on perceptions of scientific argument, empirical evidence, agreeable conclusions,
helping to understand, and well-written natures of the articles presented. Multidimen-
sional scales assessing different aspects of perceived credibility are considered as
superior measurement tools than single item measurements (Metzger and Flanagin
2015). The unidimensionality of the five items was confirmed by a principal compo-
nents analysis (Hattie 1985) in a previous study in which the first principal component
had an eigenvalue of 4.125 and accounted for 82.5% of the variance. None of the
remaining principal components had an eigenvalue >1 or accounted for more than 8.1%
of the variance (Im et al. 2017). Hence, for statistical analysis, we have averaged the
scores (Uebersax 2006) of each of the five Likert items throughout the three articles each
subject scored. The resulting five averaged scores were moderately negatively skewed.
Therefore, to make them near normal, we have transformed and reflected them using the
transformation suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007):
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
Largest scoreþ 1−scorep .
After the transformation, three data points were shown to be more than 1.5 box-
lengths from the edge of their box with regard to the AGREEABLE variable. Looking
closer into those outliers, we have decided to remove them since these participants gave
repetitive answers of either 7 s or 1 s Likert scores. However, looking for multivariate
outliers, we found eight observations with Mahalanobis distance larger than the chi-
square critical variable of 20.52 (for five degrees of freedom and p < .001). As these all
looked like genuine data points, we have decided not to remove those.
Results
The Public Attitudes towards Three Disciplines
A Friedman test was run to determine if there were differences in the subjects’ views on
how the three disciplines help us understand how children learn, on how the researchers
Table 2 The five dependent variables, their alias names as used throughout this paper and their reported
MANCOVAweights
Likert item Variable name used here MANCOVA
weights
The article was well written WELL-WRITTEN 1.186
The article helped me understand the topic HELPS-UNDERSTANDING 4.445
The scientific argument in the article made sense SCIENTIFIC −0.003
The article offered strong empirical
evidence for its conclusions
EMPIRICAL −4.166
Do you agree or disagree with the conclusions of the article? AGREEABLE −0.295
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in the discipline adhere to scientific methods and on how society views the disciplines
as prestigious. Pairwise comparisons were performed with a Bonferroni correction for
multiple comparisons. The attitudes on all three aspects were found to be significantly
different between the disciplines.
χ2(2) = 142.623, p = 0.000 for the helps us understand how children learn item. Post
hoc analysis revealed statistically significant differences between AI (median = 5) and
EDPSY (median = 6) (p = 0.000) and between AI and NS (median = 6) (p = 0.000).
χ2(2) = 82.183, p = 0.000 for the adhering to scientific methods item. Post hoc
analysis revealed statistically significantly different between AI (median = 5) and
EDPSY (median = 6) (p = 0.000), between AI and NS (median = 6) (p = 0.000) and
between NS to EDPSY in favor of NS (p = 0.047).
χ2(2) = 54.072, p = 0.000 for the prestigious viewed by society item. Post hoc
analysis revealed statistically significantly different between AI (median = 5) and NS
(median = 6) (p = 0.000) and between NS to EDPSY (median = 5) (p = 0.000).
The post-hoc tests reveal the inferiority of the AI discipline frame and the slight
superiority of the neuroscience discipline frame, as is shown in Fig. 2.
The Seductive Allure of a Subject in Research Credibility
The credibility dependant construct was operationalized by five different averaged
scores, and therefore we ran a one-way MANCOVA to test for the differences between
the three experimental groups, while controlling for the subjects’ familiarity with the
discipline. There was an approximately linear relationship between each pair of the
dependent variables, as well as between the covariate, familiarity with the topic, and the
dependent variables in each group, as assessed by scatterplots. There was homogeneity
of regression slopes, as assessed by the interaction term between familiarity average
and group, F(10, 670) = 1.539, p = 0.121. The assumption of the equality of variance-
covariance matrices was violated, as Box’s test of Equality of Covariance Matrices was
shown to be statistically significant (p < .001). Since the groups have similar and large
sizes, this violation did not justify not running the MANCOVA. However, we decided
to make a conclusion based on both the Wilk’s Lambda MANOVA test, and the Pillai’s
















Neuroscience        EdPsy        AI
Fig. 2 Median Likert scores of the participants’ attitudes
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There was homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene’s Test of Homogeneity
of Variance (p > .05) for all variables. Residuals were normally distributed, as assessed
by Shapiro-Wilk’s test (p > .0033 using a Bonferroni adjustment). There was no
multicollinearity detected by both Pearson and Spearman tests: all dependent variables
were significantly moderately (<0.9) correlated. Table 3 below summarises the mean
values and standard deviations for each subject frame and credibility dimension.
The MANCOVA resulted in a statistically significant difference between the groups on
the combined dependent variables, after controlling for the participants’ discipline familiar-
ity, F(10, 674) = 2.488, p= 0.006; Wilks’ Λ = 0.930; partial η2 = 0.036. Pillai’s Trace test
has also shown a statistically significant difference, F(10, 676) = 2.484, p = 0.006; Pillai’s
Trace = 0.071; partial η2 = 0.035. The multivariate partial η2 indicates that approximately
3.5%of themultivariate variance of the dependent variables is associatedwith the difference
between the groups. This is a small to medium effect size and the relatively small size of the
effect might be accounted for the combination and transformation of the variables.
As a follow up to theMANCOVA, none of the univariate ANCOVA tests was found to
be significant at the 0.01 adjusted alpha level (while protecting against type I error 0.05
divided by five). Since all the five variables operationalize together to the same theoretical
construct of credibility (Im et al. 2017), we decided to follow-up the significant
MANCOVA result, analysing the difference between the groups in the newly created
multivariate composite variable. The weights assigned by the MANCOVA to each of the
five independent scores are shown in the rightmost column of Table 2. As can be seen, the
Table 3 Unadjusted means and standard deviation (in brackets) for each subject frame and each dependent
variable
Well-written Helps-understanding Scientific Empirical Agreeable
Neuroscience 5.44 (0.13) 5.32 (0.13) 5.43 (0.13) 5.14 (0.14) 5.46 (0.12)
Educational Psychology 5.24 (0.11) 5.14 (0.12) 5.17 (0.10) 4.94 (0.12) 5.31 (0.11)








Means of credibility scores for each group
Neuroscience Educaonal Psychology Arficial intelligence
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most influential variables (in two different directions) are HELPS-UNDERSTANDING
and EMPIRICAL.
Next, we used these weights to compute the composite credibility variable for each
participant. A Kruskal-Wallis H test was run to determine the differences in the composite
credibility score between the three groups. Distributions of the credibility score were
similar for all groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. Median credibility
scores were statistically significantly different between groups, H(2) = 18.463, p = 0.000.
Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. The post-hoc analysis revealed statisti-
cally significant differences in median scores between the Neuroscience and AI (p = .001)
disciplines, and between the Educational psychology discipline andAI (p = .001). Figure 3
shows the means of the composite credibility scores after being untransformed and re-
reflected to reverse the initial transformation (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007).
Effects of expertise and attitudes towards the subjects on the results
To determine which of the demographic background and attitude variables has a
significant effect on the credibility, we ran six multiple linear regressions. One regres-
sion model to find the independent variables which significantly contribute to the
newly created composite credibility score, and then another five regression models
for each of the univariate credibility scores. All multiple regression models significantly
predicted the different six credibility scores. Interestingly, as summarized in the table
below, three main factors repetitively contributed to high credibility scores were: (1) the
attitude that Educational psychology researchers adhere to scientific methods (in yellow
in the below table); (2) the attitude that society views Educational psychology as a
prestigious discipline (green); and (3) the attitude that AI research can help us under-
stand how children learn (brown). Moreover, only (1) was a significant predictor of the
composite credibility score, and participants age was a significant factor for help-










Neuroscience Educaonal psychology Arficial intelligence
Fig. 3 Canonical credibility mean values for all participants
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The Negative Effect of AI frame in Research Credibility Judgements of Educators
Although, our multinomial regression results did not show participants’ major is a factor
contributing to themain effect observed in our study; due to our particular research interest
in educators’ credibility judgments, and to the central role of educators in the preparation
of AI perceptions within the younger generations, we investigated whether similar results
were obtained for educators. For this purpose, a Kruskal-Wallis H test was run to
determine the differences in the composite credibility score between the three groups
within just those majoring in education. The number of educators in each condition was as
follows: the neuroscience condition (n = 20), the educational psychology (n = 20), and the
AI condition (n = 26). Distributions of the credibility score were not similar for all groups,
as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot, therefore we could not compare median
scores, but we compared the mean ranks. The distributions of composite credibility scores
were statistically significantly different between the groups, H(2) = 7.535, p = .021.
Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons. This post hoc analysis revealed statistically signifi-
cant differences in the credibility scores’mean ranks between the AI condition (25.37) and
the EdPsy condition (39.28) (p = .044), but not between the other post hoc pairwise
comparisons (Fig. 4).
Discussion
In this study, we investigated whether different disciplinary frames for the same educational
research evidence affect the general public’s perceptions of the credibility of that research
evidence. In this section, we will discuss the results presented in the previous section,
consider their implications and the current study’s limitations. We conclude the section with
a discussion of future research directions and some suggestions to the AIED community.
Going back to our first research question: Is the perceived credibility of evidence
affected by the disciplinary field within which it is framed? The primary finding was that
the perceived credibility of educational research evidence decreaseswhen it is framed inAI.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first study investigating this impact which we name
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Fig. 4 Canonical credibility mean ranks for educators
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judgments of research evidence is argued to be very small in online studies (Michael et al.
2013). However, our results revealed statistically significant differences in median scores
between the Neuroscience and AI (p = .001) disciplines, and between the Educational
psychology discipline and AI (p = .001). On the other hand, our results show that such an
effect is not observed for neuroscience framing. This result is consistent with previous work
which shows that the seductive allure effect of neuroscience is driven by rich depictions of
brain structure and function (McCabe and Castel 2008), yet when an article describing a
psychological finding alone is contrasted with an article that additionally includes an
extraneous verbal description of a neuroscience frame no effect is observed (Hook and
Farah 2013; Schweitzer et al. 2013; Im et al. 2017).Whenwe looked at the particular group
of educators to see if the results we observed for the general public would also obtain for
teachers, we found similar results that AI framed articles were considered statistically
significantly less credible than educational psychology and neuroscience framed ones by
educators.
One significant limitation of the previous studies was the confounding factor of
article length. In this study, we kept the article length the same for neuroscience, AI,
and the control condition of educational psychology and found that the framing of
neuroscience had no statistically significant impact on the perceived credibility of the
research evidence. This result is aligned with other recent studies (i.e Hook and Farah
2013; Schweitzer et al. 2013; Gruber and Dickerson 2012) and might be due to a
decline in the seductive allure of neuroscience effect (Schooler 2011). Based on these
results, we could also expect a decline in the “in-credible AI effect”, if and when
reliable and valid scientific research and representations of AI are reflected in press
coverage, and the public image of the discipline is recovered.
Our second question investigated the public perceptions of the subjects of AI,
neuroscience, and educational psychology. Our questionnaire involved nine items:
three questions examining the attitudes of the participant about each of the three
disciplines. Specifically, all participants were asked about: (1) whether the discipline
can help understanding how children learn; (2) whether researchers practising in the
discipline adhere to scientific methods; and (3) whether society views the discipline as
prestigious for each of the three disciplines. In terms of item one, although there was no
statistically significant difference between educational psychology and neuroscience,
AI was considered as less useful to help us understand how children learn. Further-
more, Neuroscience was considered as the most adherent to scientific methods, and
Artificial Intelligence was considered the least adherent to scientific methods. Both
differences were statistically significant between the three disciplines. On the other
hand, neuroscience was considered as a more prestigious discipline than AI and
Educational Psychology. These results are aligned with the previous research which
shows that college students’ perceptions of neuroscience as a more prestigious disci-
pline than natural science, psychology, social psychology, and social sciences
(Fernandez-Duque et al. 2015, experiment 2). However, our research extends the
results about the perceptions of college students to the general public sampled here.
The same study also shows that any potential effect of the seductive allure of neuro-
science is not due to the prestige of the discipline (ibid, experiment 3). This finding is
replicated in our results. So, although neuroscience is perceived as a more prestigious
subject than AI and educational psychology, this perception does not extend to public
judgements about the credibility of research evidence framed in neuroscience.
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As argued earlier in this paper and the literature, the recipient of the information
must be considered as an influencing factor on the way that information is processed
and perceived (Metzger and Flanagin 2015). Therefore, the last research question was
about the individual differences in the credibility of evidence framed in different
disciplines: neuroscience, educational psychology and AI. We investigated all the
potential confounding variables we collected to see if any of them would account for
the public’s bias in their judgments of research credibility. We found significant positive
correlations between the familiarity with the article topic and the bias against credibility
(r = 0.374, p < 0.0001). Similar results are frequently cited in the previous literature
(Rhodes et al. 2014; Scurich and Shniderman 2014; Im et al. 2017). As argued in the
context of scientific reasoning more generally, people judge the credibility of arguments
that they are familiar with higher than the credibility of arguments that are unfamiliar to
them, or that they disagree with (Greenhoot et al. 2004). For potential reasons behind
such bias please see studies on confirmation bias (Nickerson 1998) and availability
heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1973).
Our results show that after controlling for participants’ familiaritywith the topic, evidence
in the AI framed educational evidence is still considered as statistically significantly less
credible than neuroscience and educational psychology frames. The only significant predic-
tor of the incredible AI effect for the overall research credibility was the public attitude
towards whether they considered educational psychology researchers adhered to scientific
methods or not. Although explaining a relatively small portion of the variance in the
composite index, AI frame’s relative low credibility to neuroscience and educational
psychology is statistically significantly affected by people’s attitudes towards educational
psychology researchers’ adherence to scientific methods. Based on the direction and
significance of the coefficient, those people who think that educational psychology re-
searchers adhere to the scientific methods are more likely to judge educational research
evidence we presented in our conditions as more credible. In addition to this, two other
factors repetitively contributed to sub-categories of our credibility measure were:
(1) the attitude that society views educational psychology as a prestigious discipline (green);
(2) the attitude that AI research can help us understand how children learn (brown).
Interestingly, the demographic features including participants’ age, gender, education
level, and their academic major were not found to predict the main study effect on the
composite credibility score. The only demographic featurewhichwas found to significantly
predict the empirical nature and helps with understanding scores was the participants’ age.
An increase in participants’ age leads to a statistically significant decrease in their judgment
of the empirical and helps with their understanding scores of the research credibility.
Limitations and Future Research
First of all, it is important to qualify our sampling of the public studied here. Clearly, due to
pragmatic reasons, it is an impossible task to obtain a cross-section of the population that can
be referred to as the general public. In Fig. 1 and its following paragraph, we clearly qualify
the participants recruited in this research study. Our findings should be interpreted by taking
these qualifications into considerations. Moreover, the recruited participants were from an
online survey platform who are self-selected people motivated to take part in the survey
(Paolacci and Chandler 2014). It is safe to assume that the sample is computer literate, to
some extent at least and, some of them at least, might feel more comfortable with what they
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know about AI. Therefore, there might be a potential bias amongst them against AI, in
comparison with the other two subjects. To avoid a potential expertise bias we controlled for
the sample’s major subject but nevertheless, they might feel proficient in one area, whereas
not necessarily in others.
It is important to emphasise that, our demographics show the expected diversity from a
public sample (Fig. 1) and sampling from an online survey platform is still considered as
more representative compared to sampling from schools, universities, or social media
approaches (Casler et al. 2013). However, the results of this paper should be interpreted
cautiously with regard to any potential bias of the online recruitment approach we used
and further research investigations of the different groupings as well as how people
consider subject frames when evaluating the credibility of a claim should be undertaken.
Moreover, in this study, we collected data from participants familiarity with the subject,
attitudes towards the subjects, their demographic features and used this data in our
analysis of the results and their interpretation. However, participants’ prior knowledge
of the topic or their reasoning ability was not explicitly measured in this study and should
be considered in future studies. We also did not collect data on participants’ reading times
which can provide valuable information for the interpretation of the results. Furthermore,
the regression predicting the composite credibility variable in Table 4 shows a small
portion of its variance explanation, relative to the explained variance of the individual
dependent variables. This might suggest that future studies might evaluate more factors to
this unidimensional construct. Alternatively, we also suggest rethinking the assumed
unidimensionality of the five items. This effect might be ‘blurred out’ by the weighted
averaging of the composition (whichmight be causing the individual effects to cancel out
on each other). Besides, only 3.5% of the multivariate variance was found to be
accounted for the group differences in our MANCOVA, which might be lowered by
the transformation and averaging of the dependent variables. As this is the first study to
show the “in-credible AI effect”, we suggest that the results should be approached by
caution and argue that further research is required to replicate the findings of this paper
and better define different heuristics used by recipients for their credibility scores. For
instance, a follow-up study can explore if the findings would be replicated when the
research evidence presented to participants are for engineering or general educational
interventions rather than for learning as studied in this paper. Moreover, there should be
further examinations of whether the lack of perceived credibility judgements of partic-
ipants would transfer to influencing their choices of intervention in educational settings.
Brief Suggestions of Actions for the AIED Community
There might be various reasons that might lead to the results we presented in this paper
including the perceptual processing hypothesis, the potential prestige of the framing disci-
pline, the jargon of certain disciplines might create an impression that the information
presented is more or less credible, or the brain-as-engine-of-mind hypothesis. In addition
to these, there might also be issues with regard to participants confusion on the relatively
unfamiliar nature of AI framing to the contexts of education. It might be the case that AI is
only considered as an approach to building tools that canmimic or replicate humans, yet not
as a discipline that can be a source of evidence with regard to teaching and learning.
Therefore, an AI frame of a psychology finding can just be confusing for the readers and
can lead them to score its credibility low. It might also be the case that the participants think
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that AI in Education is only about building systems to optimise learning by changing
multiple variables in engineering design solutions. This positioning is different than consid-
ering AI as an approach to engage with scientific investigations of learning with hypothesis
testing. This could have also potentially explained the findings of this paper.
We also hypothesise that, at least partially, the in-credible AI effect might stem from
the discrepancy between the actual AI research and its image in popular media. There
appears to be a clear lack of public understanding of the mechanisms behind AI in
Education. Although a detailed discussion on potential mitigation of the effect observed
in this study is not within the scope of this paper, here we suggest that AI in Education
community should attempt to be more actively engaged with the public to help mitigate
such an effect. Providing training opportunities on the basics of AI might mitigate the
adverse effect of AI framing (see, for instance, https://www.elementsofai.com).
Moreover, currently, in the field there appears to be a lack of engagement by
academics with public, practitioners and developers to provide accessible research
evidence and guidance; academics should see this as a worthy enterprise and for
which academic staff should be given time and encouragement. There is a lack of
systematically reviewed evaluation reports of AI technologies and most independent AI
in Education research is not accessible to the key stakeholders of educators and the
public. There should be further attempts to create shared understanding opportunities
among the key stakeholders of AI in Education community (i.e. www.educate.london).
Conclusions
This study investigated the impact of framing educational research evidence in different
subject disciplines upon people’s perceptions of the presented research evidence’s
credibility. We discovered that when educational research evidence is framed within
AI, it is considered as less credible compared to when it is framed within neuroscience
or educational psychology. The effect is still evident even when the subjects’ familiarity
with the topic is controlled for. The effect is also evident among educators took part in
this study. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to show that an AI
framing of educational research evidence influences the credibility of presented find-
ings. We aim to study the effect further in both qualitative and quantitative studies, but
also with different samples of participants including teachers, researchers, and students
who are expected to adopt and use AI technologies in education.
Funding Information This research was partially funded by UCL’s Grand Challenge of Transformative
Technology small grants award.
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B. Items measuring attitude towards educational psychology, neuroscience, AI
research.
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D. The educational article examples
Example Item 1. Spacing Effect
Introduction Researchers investigated the effect of study schedule – the order in which
items are studied – on learning. In this study, participants learned
paired-associates presented according to one of two schedules. Each
paired-associated combined a common word from English with a word
from an artificial language (e.g., dog – wug). Participants in the
massed condition learned each paired-associates four times in a row
during each trial. Participants in the spaced condition learned each
paired-associated four times spread across for different trials.
I. Psychological finding
alone
One day later, participants were given a delayed cued-recall tests. They
were presented the first word of each paired-associate and had to recall
the second word. The results showed that participants in the spaced
condition had better memory for the paired-associates than participants
in the massed condition.
II. Extraneous
neuroscience finding
These results are consistent with the results of a recent neuroscience study. This
study found that participants who spaced their learning showed greater
activation in the left frontal operculum than participants who massed their
learning. This brain area is thought to be involved in encoding new
information via verbal maintenance rehearsal.
IV. Brain Image
Conclusion These findings suggest that spacing (or “distributing”) practice over a long period
of time results in better learning than massing (or “cramming”) practice over a
short period of time.
1a. Spacing Effect
Introduction Researchers investigated the effect of study schedule – the order in which
items are studied – on learning. In this study, participants learned
paired-associates presented according to one of two schedules. Each
paired-associated combined a common word from English with a word
from an artificial language (e.g., dog – wug). Participants in the massed
condition learned each paired-associates four times in a row during each
trial. Participants in the spaced condition learned each paired-associated
four times spread across for different trials.
I. Psychological
finding alone
One day later, participants were given a delayed cued-recall tests. They were
presented the first word of each paired-associate and had to recall the second
word. The results showed that participants in the spaced condition had better
memory for the paired-associates than participants in the massed condition.
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II. Extraneous verbal
input
A number of theoretical constructs have been proposed to account for the
beneficial effects of spacing on memory for repeated items. One popular
account sees subjects as devoting less attention or rehearsal to
successively repeated, or massed, items This could be either a consciously
controlled strategy of allocating more rehearsal to weaker items or an
automatic process that responds to the novelty of a just-presented item.
III. Extraneous Image
Conclusion These findings suggest that spacing (or “distributing”) practice over a long period
of time results in better learning than massing (or “cramming”) practice over a
short period of time.
References
Kahana, M. J., & Howard, M. W. (2005). Spacing and lag effects in free recall of pure lists. Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, 12, 159-164. doi:10.3758/BF03196362 [Educational psychology]
Callan, D. E., & Schweighofer, N. (2010). Neural correlates of the spacing effect in explicit verbal semantic
encoding support the deficient‐processing theory. Human Brain Mapping, 31, 645-659. doi: 10.1002/
hbm.20894 [neuroscience]
Example Item 2. Engagement
Introduction Researchers investigated the extent to which student engagement is associated with
experimental and traditional measures of academic performance. The sample
consisted of 1058 students at 14 four-year colleges and universities that completed




Many measures of student engagement were linked positively with such
desirable learning outcomes as critical thinking and grades. The results
showed statistically significant positive correlations between student
engagement results and academic achievement scores, both before and
after controls were added for a host of student characteristics. Level of
academic challenge, supportive campus climate, reading and writing,
quality of relationships, institutional emphases on good practices, and
general education gains were some of the control variables tested.
II. Extraneous AI
finding
These results are consistent with the results of a recent artificial intelligence
in education study. Using machine learning techniques and AI approaches,
researchers designed an algorithm for detecting students’ engagement
behaviours as part of an intelligent tutoring system. The results show that
students’ academic achievement is higher when they present higher
engagement values.
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IV. AI’s architecture
Conclusion These findings suggest that students’ academic performance is higher when they
present higher engagement results.
2a. Engagement
Introduction Researchers investigated the extent to which student engagement is associated with
experimental and traditional measures of academic performance. The sample
consisted of 1058 students at 14 four-year colleges and universities that completed




Many measures of student engagement were linked positively with such
desirable learning outcomes as critical thinking and grades. The results
showed statistically significant positive correlations between student
engagement results and academic achievement scores, both before and
after controls were added for a host of student characteristics. Level of
academic challenge, supportive campus climate, reading and writing,
quality of relationships, institutional emphases on good practices, and
general education gains were some of the control variables tested.
II. Extraneous verbal
input
When well-crafted, student surveys can provide insights into the student experience
of engagement that other sources of information cannot, such as estimates of one’s
ability to interact effectively with others on an individual basis or in small groups,
and the degree to which one’s values and ethics have developed since starting
school or college.
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IV. Extraneous image
Conclusion These findings suggest that students’ academic performance is higher when they
present higher engagement results.
References
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linkages. Research in higher education, 47(1), 1-32. [Educational psychology].
Baker, R. S., Corbett, A. T., Roll, I., & Koedinger, K. R. (2008). Developing a generalizable detector of when
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Education] Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, 18(3), 287-314. [AI in Education]
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E. Items measuring the familiarity and credibility of each educational article
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